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HOMELESSNESS, CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE  
PATHOLOGIES OF POLICY: 
TRIANGULATING ON A  
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING 
R. GEORGE WRIGHT† 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of a roof over one’s head seems clear to most 
of us.  But private charity, the insurance markets, and the 
regulatory state offer no guarantees that this most elemental 
need will be even minimally met.  This Article focuses on the 
continuing denial of any federal constitutional right to even 
minimal housing,1 despite the sense that basic values such as 
meaningful liberty, equality, community, fundamental human 
flourishing, and basic capacity development seem to suggest a 
right.2 
Given that arguments for a constitutional right to even 
minimal3 housing from these clearly basic values alone have by 
themselves not yet moved the needle, this Article takes a 
different approach.  The focus herein supplements the basic 
values arguments with other important considerations that 
triangulate, or converge, on a federal constitutional right to 
housing.  These considerations, in their joint convergence, 
collectively exert additional moral and intellectual pressure in 
favor of recognizing the constitutional right in question. 
 
† Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney 
School of Law. The author's thanks are hereby gratefully extended to Kylee Tomblin. 
1 See, for a cursory treatment at the federal constitution level, Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 In large measure, this Article leaves open the precise contours and limits of a 
constitutional right to housing as best resolved through discussion, experience, 
experiment, and revision, partly at the stage of implementation. For some guidance 
in this respect, though, see infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text. 
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In particular, the case law addressing homelessness, and 
homelessness-related conditions and activities, as criminal 
offenses avoids considering any possible constitutional right to 
housing.  Imposing criminal responsibility implies, without 
discussion, the absence of any relevant constitutional right to 
engage in the homelessness-related conduct in question.  But 
criminalization of homelessness-related conditions and activities 
turns out to be, as argued below, hopelessly burdened with 
unresolvable basic theoretical problems.4  These basic problems 
are inherent not only in homelessness-specific contexts,5 but less 
dramatically and less conspicuously in other contexts as well.6  
Recognizing a constitutional right to housing would allow the 
courts and society to bypass these unresolvable basic problems of 
purported individual criminal responsibility in the context of 
homelessness-related crimes. 
The converging pressures for recognizing at least some 
minimal constitutional right to housing build further when we 
then go on, separately, to consider how the officially adopted 
policies of governments, at all levels, and across a wide range of 
contexts, have causally contributed in important ways to the 
incidence and pathologies of homelessness.7  Governments cannot 
at this point legitimately seek to stand apart from the problems 
of homelessness and then independently assess, with utter 
detachment, the gravity of such problems as though 
homelessness-related problems were entirely natural or privately 
generated phenomena.  Governments at all levels are already 
actively involved in various ways in causing and in at least 
minimally addressing, however ineffectively, the problems of 
homelessness.8  A range of government policies at all levels 
contributes to the most basic harms of homelessness.  However 
radical someone might think a federal constitutional right to 
housing is, recognizing such a right would amount to a corrective 
of causally relevant current government policies, rather than an 
initial, perhaps gratuitous, entry by government into new 
territory.9 
 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 See infra notes 27–88 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 See infra Part II. 
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When we then finally return to and briefly further consider 
the classic values case for a constitutional right to housing—as a 
third, triangulating, converging source of moral and intellectual 
pressure and motivation10—the case for recognizing a federal 
constitutional right to at least minimal housing becomes far more 
difficult to dismiss. 
I. IS THERE A JUSTIFIED AND WORKABLE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN PERSONALLY CULPABLE AND NONCULPABLE 
HOMELESSNESS? 
A number of the leading homelessness cases take a stand on 
questions of criminal responsibility for homelessness-related 
offenses.  In the end, though, the cases do not adopt or imply any 
coherent approach to the inescapable questions of responsibility 
that are at issue.11  An approach, such as that herein, that can 
legitimately bypass these perennially unresolved issues of 
responsibility is thus attractive. 
The starting point for judicial discussions of this sort, 
including in particular the possible applicability of cruel and 
unusual punishment doctrine, is the classic narcotic addiction 
case of Robinson v. California.12  Robinson itself did not involve 
homelessness, but rather the presumed status of being addicted, 
whatever the lines of causality, to narcotics.13  The offense in 
 
10 See infra Part III. Of special interest is that the case for a constitutional right 
to housing, at the level of basic values, need not itself converge on any single 
substantive value or set of values. A constitutional right to housing can be defended 
on either overlapping, cumulating, or some distinct ground. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1734 (1995); see also 
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 9, 
24–25 (1987). 
11 Among the leading and most suggestive cases, chronologically, are Robinson 
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536–37 (1968); 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Tobe v. City of 
Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1109, 892 P.2d 1145, 1169, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 426 
(1995); Johnson v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated 
as moot following settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); Lehr v. City of 
Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Allen v. City of 
Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 678 (2015); People v. 
Diaz, 24 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 8, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 432 (2018); Manning v. 
Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d 
264 (4th Cir. 2019); Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 2018), 
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019); 
O’Callaghan v. City of Portland, 736 Fed. Appx. 704, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2018); and 
First Lutheran Church v. City of St. Paul, 2018 WL 3762560, at *8 (D. Minn. 2018). 
12 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664. 
13 See id. at 665. 
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question did not require a showing of either possession or use of 
any narcotic while within the State of California.14  The Court 
thus sought to distinguish between criminalizing what it referred 
to as a “status”—in particular, the status of being an addict—and 
criminalizing some behavior or conduct, even of a passive or 
negative sort.15 
There, the presumed status of drug addiction was conceived 
of as an illness,16 and thus analogous to having a common cold.17  
As any criminal punishment for merely having a cold would 
presumably constitute cruel and unusual punishment,18 so any 
punishment for the mere status or condition of being addicted to 
a narcotic would similarly violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.19  The cruelty and unusualness of the 
punishment in such cases derives not from the length or severity 
of the criminal punishment, but from the inappropriateness of 
any punishment in such a case at all.20 
The United States Supreme Court returned to these themes 
in their divided opinions in the public drunkenness and 
alcoholism case of Powell v. Texas.21  In Powell, the four Justice 
plurality rejected the defendant’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause challenge and distinguished the prior 
holding in Robinson.22  Crucially, California had attempted to 
criminally punish a mere status, that of being addicted, in 
Robinson.23  But Texas, in the later Powell case, had criminalized 
not the presumed status or condition of being an alcoholic,24 but 
the public behavior or conduct of appearing drunk in public on a 
particular occasion.25 
The plurality in Powell thus again sought to rely on a 
distinction between a mere status or condition on the one hand, 
and conduct or behavior on the other.26  The Powell plurality 
 
14 See id. at 665–66. 
15 See id. at 665–68. 
16 See id. at 667. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See generally 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
22 See id. at 532–33. 
23 See id. at 532. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. at 533; see also Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 
1228–29 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1105, 892 P.2d 
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interprets Robinson to rest upon this purported distinction, 
rather than on a distinction between voluntary acts27 and 
involuntary conduct,28 or conduct that occurs under some 
relevant sort of compulsion.29  Importantly, the plurality in 
Powell argues for the difficulty of limiting, in any principled and 
attractive way, the exclusion from punishment of “involuntary” 
or somehow “compelled” conduct.30  In particular, the plurality 
argues that 
[i]f Leroy Powell cannot be convicted of public intoxication, it is 
difficult to see how a State can convict an individual for murder, 
if that individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other 
respects, suffers from a “compulsion” to kill, which is an 
“exceedingly strong influence,” but “not completely 
overpowering.”31 
The plurality in Powell was thus concerned that attempts to 
restrict familiar understandings of personal32 or moral33 
accountability34 could themselves be limited only on an arbitrary 
and unprincipled basis.35 
As it turned out, however, Justice White’s opinion concurring 
in the Powell result36 might for some purposes be treated as the 
technical holding in Powell.37  Justice White appears to question 
the plurality’s use of both the supposed status versus conduct  
 
 
 
1145, 1166 (1995); Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 669–70 (2015) 
(“What constitutes ‘might elude perfect definition,’ but factors such as the 
involuntary acquisition of the characteristic . . . and the degree to which a person 
has control over that characteristic” are to be included). The obvious problem here is 
that this account relies, without clarification, on the ideas of voluntariness and 
involuntariness, and on the equally underdeveloped idea of “control” and degrees 
thereof. See Ashbaucher v. City of Arcata, 2010 WL 11211481, at *9, *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 19, 2010). 
27 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 534. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. at 535. 
33 See id. at 535–36. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. at 534–35. 
36 See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). 
37 See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (seeking to 
establish the Court’s judicial holding in the absence of any single majority rationale). 
But see Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 619–21 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(discussing the logical limitations of the Marks rule). 
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distinction and its understanding of the voluntariness versus 
involuntariness distinction.38  Justice White argues at the level of 
principle that 
[i]f it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to 
use39 narcotics, . . . I do not see how it can constitutionally be a 
crime to yield to such a compulsion.  Punishing an addict for 
using drugs convicts for addiction40 under a different name.  
Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding 
criminal conviction for being sick with flu41 or epilepsy but 
permitting punishment for running a fever or having a 
convulsion.42 
Set aside, for the moment, all complications associated with 
possible voluntariness, negligence or recklessness, assumption of 
the risk, responsibility, or the inevitability or blamelessness of 
some instances of either addiction or the flu, or the severity of flu 
symptoms.43 
Justice White, however, nonetheless voted to uphold Powell’s 
conviction, on the theory that the conviction was not for 
alcoholism or drinking chronically, or for being drunk, but for 
appearing in a public place while drunk.44  The compulsion to 
drink or to drink to excess was not shown, in this case, to 
encompass any necessity to appear thus in any public place, as 
distinct from, say, a private home.45  Justice White was of the 
view that “common sense and . . . common knowledge”46 suggest 
that a chronic alcoholic need not appear in public while 
intoxicated.47 
 
38 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 549–50 (White, J., concurring). 
39 Justice White at this point cites Robinson not for a status versus conduct 
distinction, but for the non-criminalizability of the presumably compelled use of the 
addictive drug. See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). 
40 Addiction is classified by Robinson as a status, but on Justice White’s view, 
not meaningfully distinguishable, as to culpability or responsibility, from the closely 
associated somehow compelled conduct. 
41 It would seem that in some cases, catching or having the flu, and displaying 
flu symptoms of whatever severity, could reflect the sufferer’s earlier choices or 
conduct. See, e.g., Flu (Influenza), VACCINES (January 2018), https://www.vaccines. 
gov/diseases/flu; Flu Treatment with Antiviral Drugs, WEBMD, https://www.webmd. 
com/cold-and-flu/flu-medications#1 (last visited Aug. 17, 2019,). See generally infra 
note 154 and accompanying text. 
42 Powell, 392 U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
43 For a start on such matters, consider the sources cited supra note 41. 
44 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 549 (White, J., concurring). 
45 See id. 
46 Id. at 549. 
47 See id. at 549–50. 
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The four Justice dissenting opinion in Powell48 then 
formulated the key issue as one of the scope of the relevant 
compulsion or disease,49 with status or condition encompassing 
not just compelled intoxication but also including appearing in 
public while thus intoxicated.50  In the language of the Powell 
dissenting opinion, the question was 
whether a criminal penalty may be imposed upon a person 
suffering the disease of “chronic alcoholism” for a condition—
being in a state of intoxication in public—which is a 
characteristic part51 of the pattern of his disease and . . . not the 
consequence of appellant’s volition but of “a compulsion 
symptomatic52 of the disease of chronic alcoholism.”53 
Justice Fortas concluded that despite the differences between the 
statutes in Robinson and Powell, the basic logic of Robinson 
controlled the result in Powell.54  While the statute in Powell 
required more than a showing of chronic alcoholism or 
uncontrollable drinking,55 “in both cases the particular defendant 
was accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to 
change or avoid.”56  The condition in Powell’s case included the 
realistic inability to avoid being intoxicated in some public place 
at some time.57 
Ultimately, the principle adopted by Justice Fortas’s 
dissenting opinion is that punishment is inappropriate “if the 
condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 See id. at 554 (Fortas J., dissenting). Justice Fortas was joined by Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart. 
49 See id. at 558. 
50 See id. 
51 The idea of a “characteristic” part as used here presumably refers not merely 
to what typically occurs, but to what must occur in conjunction with the disease 
itself with some sufficient compulsion or inescapability. 
52 As with the reference to that which is “characteristic” of the disease, see 
Powell, 392 U.S. at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting), so the reference to a symptom of the 
disease presumably incorporates some sufficient degree of necessity or compulsion. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 567–68. 
55 See id. at 567. 
56 Id. at 568. 
57 See id. 
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pattern of [the] disease and is occasioned by a compulsion 
symptomatic of the disease.”58  This principle is, interestingly, 
claimed to be “narrow in scope and applicability.”59 
The Powell dissent’s formulation, however, raises more 
questions than it answers.  Most importantly, the narrowness or 
breadth of the principle cannot forever be entirely a matter of 
Justice Fortas’s own expectations.  The logic of a declared 
principle may have a life of its own.  In particular, the principle 
may, by its own logic, break through whatever narrow 
constraints its adopters had in mind. 
One crucial and obvious possibility, as noted below,60 is that 
the principles endorsed by both the four Justice dissent and by 
Justice White in the Powell case may not be logically confinable 
to narcotic addiction, to chronic alcoholism, to any set of 
recognized diseases, or even to disease in general, whether the 
condition in question arises through conduct or not.  Neither the 
presence of a medical disease, nor of diseases in general, may be 
particularly relevant to questions of moral or legal responsibility. 
As well, the attempt, running throughout both Robinson and 
Powell, to distinguish between statuses on the one hand and 
conduct on the other may well be doomed to failure.  At the very 
least, the status versus conduct distinction may tell us very  
little about persuasively distinguishing responsible criminal 
defendants from those who cannot properly be held responsible. 
Even setting aside the typical defenses and excusing 
conditions, a defendant’s conduct may, on one theory or another, 
be compelled,61 or may result from a sort of “compulsion,”62 
beyond the defendant’s “capacity to change or avoid,”63 entirely 
apart from any recognized disease or special condition.  
Responsibility may also be inappropriate even in the absence of 
any form of compulsion if the status or conduct at issue reflects 
not choice but mere random processes.64 
 
58 Id. at 569. Thus, both the relevant disease and the ensuing criminalized 
conduct might both be compelled, with the latter perhaps compelled by the former, 
or by other causes. 
59 Id. 
60 See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
61 See supra text accompanying notes 42, 47. 
62 See supra text accompanying notes 42, 47. 
63 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
64 See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text, as well as the convenient 
collection of brief references to the implications of merely random processes in The 
Standard Argument Against Free Will, THE INFO. PHILOSOPHER (last visited Aug. 7, 
2019), www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/standard_argument.html. 
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Ultimately, focusing on supposedly distinctive statuses or 
conditions and related conduct, even with the familiar sorts of 
legal defenses and excuses, may turn out to be logically 
underinclusive in mapping the absence of criminal responsibility.  
Disease, addiction, or homelessness may in the end merely point 
the way to a much narrower scope for any genuine  
criminal responsibility.  Thus, persuasively imputing criminal 
responsibility to persons in homelessness-related contexts and 
beyond may be surprisingly difficult. 
This possibility is highlighted by reflecting broadly on the 
cases addressing65 whether a conviction for homelessness-related 
offenses might violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.66  Among the most recent and illuminating cases is the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Martin v. City of Boise.67 
Martin holds specifically that “the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, 
sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless 
individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”68  The theory there is 
that no criminal punishment is defensible and appropriate for 
sitting, sleeping, or lying, whether thought of as statuses or as 
conduct,69 insofar as such statuses or conduct are realistically 
unavoidable, as the “universal and unavoidable consequences of 
being human.”70  As being homeless in public places cannot itself  
 
 
 
 
65 Eighth Amendment issues would not be reached in the absence of a plaintiff’s 
standing, as when a court deems that no relevant punishment has been threatened 
or applied. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1995). 
66 Strictly, typical criminal homelessness cases involving state or municipal law 
consider the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
as the Eighth Amendment is made binding on the states through its incorporation 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which itself binds states and 
cities therein. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682,  
686–87 (2019) (finding the Eighth Amendment’s “excessive fines” prohibition as 
binding on the states via Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
incorporation). 
67 See generally 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), opinion amended and superseded 
on denial of reh’g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019). 
68 Id. at 1048. 
69 See id. 
70 Id. (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation omitted). 
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be criminalized,71 what inevitably follows from being homeless in 
public—sitting, lying, or sleeping in public72—cannot under those 
circumstances be criminalized either.73 
Martin seeks minimally to distinguish culpable 
homelessness from nonculpable homelessness.  The basic 
assumption is that someone who temporarily abandons a viable 
residence merely for the purpose of, say, personal amusement, 
investigative journalism, to win a frivolous bet, or to test the 
limits of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause may be 
culpable in a way that should not apply to at least some more 
typical cases of homelessness.  But the court in Martin does not 
begin to explore the ultimate tenability of any such distinction.74 
At a more immediate practical policy level, Martin disclaims 
any obligation on the part of any government to provide any 
housing on any terms,75 let alone any constitutional right to 
housing.76  Rather, the Martin court’s holding is merely that 
 
71 See id. at 1048. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. To the contrary, the recent Fourth Circuit case, Manning v. Caldwell, 
over a dissent, held that “although states may not criminalize status, they may 
criminalize actual behavior even when the individual alleges that addiction created 
a strong urge to engage in a particular act.” 900 F.3d 139, 146–47 (4th Cir. 2018), 
rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). Perhaps more strongly, 
Manning also allows for the criminalizing of conduct that is proximately caused by 
non-volitional or involuntary acts. See id. at 147. Neither here nor in other cases do 
we find a persuasive account of the relationship among addiction, strong or 
realistically irresistible desires, non-volitional acts, and criminal responsibility, or 
even of the relationships between policy judgments of proximate cause and, say, 
deterministic cause in fact. A sharply divided en banc Fourth Circuit reversed the 
panel decision on grounds partly of vagueness, but as well on Eighth Amendment 
grounds. The en banc majority construed the plaintiffs’ complaint to allege “targeted 
criminalization . . . of conduct that is an involuntary manifestation of their illness, 
and that is otherwise legal for the general population,” Manning, 930 F.3d at 284, 
and thus that depends upon no prior criminal conviction and involves no volitional 
element, where the conduct in question is generally lawful for the drinking age 
population. See id. The theory therein seems to be that punishing entirely 
involuntary conduct can be permissible where that conduct is deemed sufficiently 
dangerous as to warrant its general, across the board criminalization for some 
broader population. See id. 
74 See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048. The Martin court therein refers to ideas such  
as inevitability, unavoidability, and involuntariness, but with no meaningful 
clarification. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. The classic cite to a presumed denial of a federal constitutional right to 
housing is Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no “constitutional 
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality”). Access to housing and 
access to housing of some unspecified quality may, however, pose distinct issues. 
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otherwise nonculpable77 homelessness cannot be punished 
consistent with the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.78  And for the court’s purposes, such homelessness 
includes its presumably inevitable incidents, including resting on 
public property.79 
The Martin court pursued questions of inevitability, 
unavoidability, and involuntariness only to the limited, and quite 
dubious, extent of insisting upon an inquiry into the relation 
between the current number of homeless persons in the relevant 
jurisdiction and the current number of available beds in that 
jurisdiction’s public and private homeless shelters.80  Setting 
aside various associated problems, the Martin court concluded 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of criminal convictions 
in this context could be involved, oddly, only when the number of 
local homeless persons begins to exceed the number of local 
simultaneously available shelter beds.81 
Under this rule, the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to 
homelessness-related offenses is thus a matter of comparing two 
aggregated totals.  Very roughly, the crucial comparison is 
between the current total objective need for shelter and the 
current total supply of shelter within the particular jurisdiction.82  
If the former, as an overall total, exceeds the latter, then the 
possibility of an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause claim may be available. 
This rule raises difficult and important conceptual, 
measurement, and policy issues.83  But perhaps the most critical 
problem is the absence of any explanation as to why an 
 
77 See unelaborated terms referred to at supra note 74. 
78 See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. Martin relied directly at this point on the vacated opinion of Jones, 
444 F.3d 1118, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2006). 
81 See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048, again relying on Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138. 
82 See sources cited supra note 81. 
83 For example, it is unclear why the nearest and most realistically available 
shelter facilities cannot be counted, despite their convenience, if they happen to be in 
a convenient neighboring local jurisdiction, rather than in the jurisdiction making 
the homelessness arrest. The temptation for any jurisdiction to free ride at the 
expense of neighboring jurisdictions, perhaps along with some desire to avoid siting 
a homelessness facility in its own “backyard,” may well be widespread. Query also 
whether a shelter at which the arrestee has previously been assaulted or robbed 
should count toward the number of total available beds. More broadly, consider 
issues of personal mobility and public transportation access to one or more of the 
shelters being counted toward the total, along with how widely known the existence 
of some facilities may be. 
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individual person’s rights, defenses, moral responsibility, and 
ultimate culpability should be crucially determined by any sort of 
relative shifting among the overall aggregate totals. 
On this Martin-Jones approach, no individual homeless 
person can invoke the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause if 
there are, however doubtless imperfectly calculated, a thousand 
local homeless persons at the same time that there are a 
thousand locally available shelter beds.  But if one such shelter 
bed is then taken out of service, reducing the number of currently 
available such beds to 999, then, under the Martin-Jones rule, 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause may apparently be 
invoked not only by the thousandth arrestee, but, crucially, by 
the first and only such arrestee.84 
To explore this odd implication of the Martin-Jones test, 
suppose that on some given day, only one person was arrested 
and charged with a homelessness-related offense.  Suppose 
further that at the time of that person’s arrest, the most 
accessible local shelter was only half full, or was even entirely 
unoccupied.  Thus, the single arrested person could, in some 
sense, have realistically claimed any one of numerous available 
shelter beds for that evening, as could any small number of other 
potential arrestees have done. 
On the logic of the Martin and Jones cases, though, even that 
sole arrestee of the day would have been able to invoke the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause based on the odd assumption 
that if, contrary to actual fact, all of the local homeless 
population had sought local shelter that day, all but one such 
person could have been accommodated.85  Any one merely 
hypothetically unaccommodated person, whether the single 
actual arrestee or not, would trigger Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause protection for that single arrestee.  So the 
first and only arrestee is, in effect, allowed under the 
Martin-Jones rule to stand in the shoes of a hypothetical 
thousandth arrestee of the day, perhaps the only arrestee out of a 
total of a thousand who could not have found shelter space that 
day, given the assumed 999 available shelter beds that day. 
The Martin-Jones rule, otherwise put, evidently assumes 
that even the first and only homeless arrestee of the day was, 
constructively, arrested only after the remainder of the homeless 
 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
85 Again, assume here that there are 1,000 homeless persons and 999 
realistically available local shelter beds. 
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population had somehow reserved all the otherwise available 
shelter beds.  Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protection 
is available based on even a slight excess of the number of 
homeless persons, whether they seek shelter space that day or not, 
over the total shelter space.86  The Martin and Jones cases do not 
attempt to explain why the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause should not, instead, more realistically be available only to 
homeless arrestees who had no realistic choice, or at best only a 
limited chance, of finding a local shelter bed. 
Suppose, by loose analogy, that we must decide whether to 
hold some single student responsible for not boarding the daily 
school bus.  Assume that all the buses the student might have 
caught were only partly full at all relevant times.  Would we 
nonetheless excuse that nonboarding student if, hypothetically, 
some other student would have been unable to board any bus if, 
contrary to fact, the students enrolled in the school had fully 
occupied all the available bus seats? 
Thus, the Martin-Jones rule differs dramatically from a more 
intuitive rule that applies the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause only if the claimant can show, with whatever degree of 
probability, that no local shelter bed would have been available 
for that particular claimant at the time of the arrest.87  Neither 
Martin nor Jones attempts to justify its own approach by 
comparison with this or with any other more plausible 
alternative approaches. 
 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 81–82. 
87 The Martin court, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048, cites a Florida federal district court 
opinion in support of its holding. But the very language quoted by Martin explicitly 
supports a rule that is in conflict with that adopted in Martin and Jones. The crucial 
Pottinger language is that “[a]s long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single 
place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances . . . punish them for 
something for which they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth 
[A]mendment . . . .” See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. 
Fla. 1992). The Pottinger language thus refers to the availability of shelter for one or 
more specific homeless arrestees, rather than to an excess of homeless persons 
overall compared to the total of currently available shelter places, even where the 
arrestees could readily have taken shelter. As well, a recent paraphrase of the 
Martin-Jones rule by the Ninth Circuit itself is actually closer to the Pottinger 
formulation above than to the language of the courts in Martin and Jones. See 
O’Callaghan v. City of Portland, 736 Fed. App’x 704, 705 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We 
recently held that a city ordinance prohibiting individuals from sleeping outside on 
public property may violate the Eighth Amendment when enforced against homeless 
individuals who have no access to alternative shelter.”). 
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Broadly, then, none of the homelessness-related cases88 
sheds much light on basic individual, collective, and institutional 
rights and responsibilities in the context of homelessness.  The 
cases seek to distinguish between homelessness-related 
conditions or acts, whether they are thought of as voluntary or 
not, that can legitimately be criminalized, and those conditions or 
acts that cannot be legitimately criminalized.89  This ongoing 
project has, however, been plainly unsuccessful. 
Crucially, the case law disturbingly recognizes that “[e]very 
criminal act can be alleged to be the result of some compulsion.  
If human behavior is viewed as something over which human 
beings lack control, and for which they are not responsible,  
the implications are boundless.”90  The case law on 
homelessness-related offenses, whether drawing upon other 
areas of case law or on legal scholarship, or neither, has not even 
begun to address, let alone resolve this and related basic 
problems. 
The evident failure of the homelessness case law to 
meaningfully address its own basic logic, implications, and 
justifiability is of obvious importance.  We might imagine, 
though, that while the criminalized homelessness case law does 
not adequately justify itself, some justification for this case law 
might be imported from outside the case law.  The natural place 
to look for meaningful justifications and critique of the 
criminalized homelessness case law would be in the leading 
philosophical discussions of responsibility, culpability, 
blameworthiness, punishment and punishability, compulsion, 
determinism and randomness, freedom of the will in various 
senses, and of voluntary and involuntary acts. 
Our best contemporary philosophers have indeed produced 
substantial literature discussing these matters.  As it turns out, 
though, the range and variety of the fundamental and persisting 
 
88 The Manning case contributes by at least recognizing the problem in this 
context of slippery slope arguments. See Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 148 
(4th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). On some 
intricacies of slippery slope arguments, see generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery 
Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the 
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1030 (2003). 
89 See sources cited supra notes 81–82. 
90 Manning, 900 F.3d at 148; see also, e.g., Michael J. Zimmerman, Varieties of 
Moral Responsibility, in THE NATURE OF MORAL RESP.: NEW ESSAYS 45 (Randolph 
Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith eds., 2018) (2015) (“There is a 
burgeoning literature on the nature of moral responsibility.”). 
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disagreements among leading scholars undermine any realistic 
possibility of clearly justifying one legal approach to 
homelessness-related criminality over another.  The most 
sophisticated approaches to moral and legal responsibility, in 
general and as applied to homelessness-related offenses, are 
fundamentally conflicting and mutually irreconcilable.91 
The basic disputes over responsibility, freedom, culpability, 
and the like are expressed through a variety of technical and 
semi-technical concepts.  The fundamental and apparently 
irreconcilable contradictions are, however, evident to all.92  Most 
basically, the leading contemporary philosophers are deadlocked 
over the actual descriptive role in the world, if any, of various 
kinds of determinism; of luck, chance, and randomness; and of 
various forms and strengths of freedom of the will.93  The leading 
philosophers are then, independently, also hopelessly deadlocked 
on the normative or prescriptive implications of any possible 
roles of determinism, luck, or randomness for questions of 
 
91 See Zimmerman, supra note 90, at 45 (“Many of these claims appear to 
conflict with one another.”) (citing several important general instances). For an 
introduction to the much more complex problem of the long term effects of belief in 
free will on the presumed morality of one’s character, see generally Damien L. Crone 
& Neil L. Levy, Are Free Will Believers Nicer People (Four Studies Suggest Not), 1 
SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1 (2018); Stephen Cave, There’s No Such Thing as 
Free Will But We’re Better Off Believing in It Anyway, THE ATLANTIC (June 2016), 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing. 
92 See, for a mere hint of the unresolved contradictions, ROBERT LOCKIE, FREE 
WILL AND EPISTEMOLOGY: A DEFENCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR 
FREEDOM 4 (2018) (“[W]ere determinism true, the determinist would lack epistemic 
justification for holding this view or maintaining this claim.”); id. at 180–81; DERK 
PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, AND MEANING IN LIFE 199 (2014) (“If we did give 
up the assumption of the sort of free will at issue [sufficient for moral responsibility], 
then, perhaps surprisingly, we might be better off as a result.”); Susan Blackmore, 
Living Without Free Will, in EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL 
RESP. 161, 162 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013) (“[W]e humans are clever 
decision-making machines that are prone to a number of powerful illusions, in 
particular the illusion of a persisting inner self with consciousness and free 
will . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Neil Levy, Be a Skeptic, Not a Metaskeptic, in 
EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESP. 87, 87 (Gregg D. Caruso 
ed., 2013) (arguing that due to either “present luck” or “constitutive luck,” “agents 
are never morally responsible for their actions”); Galen Strawson, The Impossibility 
of Ultimate Responsibility?, in EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL 
RESP. 41, 51 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013) (“[H]owever self-consciously aware we are 
as we deliberate and reason, every act and operation of our mind happens as it does 
as a result of features for which we are ultimately in no way responsible.”). 
93 See the authorities cited supra note 92. Query in particular whether genuine 
rationality-driven choice-making can actually take place under determinism or in 
the absence of libertarian free will. 
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criminal responsibility, culpability, and punishment.94  And then 
finally, it should hardly surprise us that the philosophers are 
also hopelessly deadlocked over even the basic implications of 
their views for our general legal institutions of criminal 
adjudication and the disposition of offenders.95 
At the level of practice, a limited number of the philosophers 
have indeed converged on at least some broad outlines of what 
we might call a disease quarantine analogy;96 perhaps 
supplemented by some forms of prevention, rehabilitation, cure, 
counseling, redistribution of resources, training, education, and 
broader social justice reform.97  These latter quarantine-plus-
social-justice theorists often assume some sort of collective right 
to self-protection, and protection of the basic health and safety 
interests of other persons, in justifying their analogy to 
compulsory quarantines of contagious disease carriers in the 
public health context.98 
The intended progressivism, humaneness, and benevolence 
of these quarantine models of criminal justice institutions is 
clear.  But unfortunately, equally capable philosophers have 
expressed serious doubts as to the coherence, as well as to the 
likely long-term benevolence in practice, of any version of a 
quarantine-based theory.99  One obvious problem is that if crime 
 
94 See authorities cited supra note 92. 
95 See authorities cited supra note 92. 
96 See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 186 (2001) (referring 
to an “analogy with our rationale for quarantining carriers of dangerous diseases”); 
Gregg D. Caruso, The Public Health-Quarantine Model, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
MORAL RESP. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068021 (November 14, 
2017); Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1409. 
Perhaps the most extensive development of a quarantine analogy and related social 
reforms is by Professor Bruce Waller. See, e.g., BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL 
RESP. 293–95 (2011); BRUCE N. WALLER, THE INJUSTICE OF PUNISHMENT (2018). 
97 See the sources cited supra note 96. 
98 See, e.g., Gregg D. Caruso, Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An 
Argument for Optimism, FREE WILL SKEPTICISM IN L. AND SOC’Y 10 (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758311 (April 3, 2016) (“[T]he right to harm in self-
defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with 
the minimum harm required for adequate protection.”); see also Gregg D. Caruso, 
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 18, 
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility. 
99 See, most fundamentally, the works of Professor Saul Smilansky, and in 
particular Saul Smilansky, Review of Bruce N. Waller, The Injustice of Punishment, 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct. 21, 2018), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-
injustice-of-punishment (“[C]an [moral responsibility] denialists resist the constant 
temptations for the efficient management of people . . . ?”); Saul Smilansky, Free 
Will and Respect for Persons, 29 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 248, 259 (2005) (“Value 
and meaning are inherently connected to the idea of free and responsible agency.”); 
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at the level of the individual or group is sufficiently predictable, 
preventing future criminality in a cost-effective way may seem 
more sensible than unnecessarily allowing the crime and its 
harms to occur, even if this requires sustained pre-crime 
confinement, or even involuntary medical treatment of one sort 
or another.100 
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that neither the 
homelessness-related case law, nor the most relevant and most 
sophisticated philosophical discussions, can provide a minimally 
convincing account of criminal responsibility in the context of 
homelessness and homelessness-related offenses.  The typical 
current criminal penalty of confining the convicted homeless 
defendant to some sort of housing for a substantial period is,  
in our homelessness-related cases, ironic, if not paradoxical.  
Commonly, the homelessness-related offense stems precisely 
from the homeless person’s unfulfilled wish for housing on a 
sustained basis.  Incarceration can be a sort of degradingly odd 
parody-response to that understandable wish. 
Thus, in a sense, the state responds to what it stigmatizes as 
criminally culpable conduct by itself providing the convicted 
defendant with a curious version of what the defendant 
presumably sought or felt deprived of.  It is thus left unclear why 
officially providing some parody-like form of what the defendant 
culpably sought is actually an appropriate governmental 
response.  Nor, certainly, is it clear why penologically housing a 
homeless person should depend upon whether we think of the 
homeless person’s offense as a matter of their status or of their 
conduct.101 
 
Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio, 30 L. & 
PHIL. 353, 354 (2011) (arguing that in abandoning traditional punishment, hard 
determinists are instead logically committed to counterintuitive practices that 
Smilansky refers to as “funishment”); Saul Smilansky, Pereboom On Punishment: 
Funishment, Innocence, Motivation, and Other Difficulties, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 591, 
602 (2016); Saul Smilansky, The Time to Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50, 50 (1994) (arguing 
against the logic of pre-punishment, or the disinclination to wait until an offense has 
actually been committed before isolating the eventual offender, as in some cases of a 
reformed system of preventive detention). For further discussion of the logic of  
pre-punishment in appropriate cases, see the articles collected in 68 ANALYSIS  
250–63 (2008). 
100 See the authorities cited supra note 99; Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment 
and the Burden of Proof, www.ssrn.com/abstract=2997654 (2017); John Lemos, 
Moral Concern About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals, 
35 L. & PHIL. 461 (2016). 
101 See supra notes 12–65 and accompanying text. 
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In the end, the efforts of judges and scholars of all sorts to 
provide any persuasive approach to the criminalization of 
homelessness-related conditions and activities have been 
perennially unsuccessful.  It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to 
justify any stance toward this set of criminal cases, where the 
ironies, paradoxes, basic conflicts, and dead ends regularly 
appear more directly, more clearly, more starkly, and more 
inescapably than in typical non-homelessness-related cases. 
If the deep and apparently intractable basic problems of 
criminal culpability in homelessness-related cases cannot be 
persuasively resolved, they can, on our approach, at least  
be practically bypassed.  Recognizing an enforceable federal 
constitutional right to housing, however formulated, would allow 
for such a practical bypass.  After all, there can generally be no 
criminalization of that to which we have an enforceable 
constitutional right. 
The case for a federal constitutional right to at least some 
minimal sort of housing requires, however, our recognizing that 
officially adopted government policies of various sorts, are  
among the substantial and important continuing causes of 
homelessness.  Governments ironically continue to criminalize 
conditions and activities to which governments themselves 
systematically and pervasively causally contribute. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY AS ITSELF A CRUCIAL CAUSE OF 
HOMELESSNESS AND INEVITABLE HOMELESSNESS-RELATED 
OFFENSES 
Even when treated as an administrative matter rather than 
a more serious criminal matter, the homelessness cases typically 
distort public discussion by distracting attention from the crucial 
roles of government, at all levels, in causally generating the 
status or conduct at issue in such cases.  But even if the focus of 
attention remains initially on the homeless parties, rather than 
on official policy as causal, some minimal progress can be made 
by expanding the standard criminal case analysis.  Whether 
successfully or unsuccessfully, a homeless defendant might 
reasonably seek to raise a defense of necessity,102 thereby at least 
 
102 See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR? 105, 106 
(1996). See also generally Michele Cotton, The Necessity Defense and the Moral 
Limits of Law, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2015); Dionne Cordell-Whitney, Jury Will 
Hear Pipeline Protester’s Necessity Defense, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 18, 
2018), www.courthousenews.com/jury-will-hear-pipeline (discussing a Minnesota 
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beginning to point to the homeless defendant’s broader 
circumstances.  Raising, however unsuccessfully, a defense of 
entrapment103 might also provoke reflection on governmental 
roles in causally generating homelessness and the inevitably 
resulting homelessness-related offenses.  And there is even a 
sense in which we might think of governments as complicitous, if 
not also a technical accomplice or an accessory,104 to a 
homelessness-related crime. 
But we can hardly understand homelessness, and any 
resulting related offenses, until we understand the typically 
unintended causal contributions, direct and indirect, of a number 
of official policies adopted at one governmental level or another.  
We need not here attempt to answer the broad and complex105  
question of precisely what conditions cause homelessness.106  Our 
 
court ruling allowing a climate-related necessity defense regarding oil pipeline 
activism); Antonia K. Fassinelli, Note, In re Eichorn: The Long-Awaited 
Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of 
Homelessness, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 324 (2000). 
103 For a brief mainstream account of the entrapment defense and its 
limitations, see Entrapment-Elements, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (last visited Aug. 7, 
2019), www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-645-entrapment-elements. 
104 For a thoughtful recent discussion, see generally Sherif Girgis, Note, The 
Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions, 126 YALE L.J. 460 (2013). 
105 For a brief but useful treatment of the crucial problems posed by “causal 
density,” see Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, CITY J. 
(Summer 2010), https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-social-science-does—and-
doesn’t—know-13297.html. 
106 Accounts of the most important causes of homelessness, with or without 
implicating government policies, tend toward consensus, along with a sense that 
these causes may have interactive and compounding effects. The National Law 
Center on Homelessness and Poverty cites “insufficient income and lack of 
affordable housing,” domestic violence, unemployment, mental illness, and 
substance abuse. See Homelessness in America: Overview of Data and Causes, NAT’L 
L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY (January 2015), https://nlchp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet.pdf; see also Exploring the 
Crisis of Unsheltered Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (June 
20, 2018), https://endhomelessness.org/exploring-crisis-unsheltered-homelessness; 
Barrett A. Lee et al., The New Homelessness Revisited, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 501,  
509–10 (2010) (referring to, for example, limited supplies of affordable housing, 
abuse and neglect as a child, poverty, family conflict, alcohol and drug abuse, mental 
illness, domestic violence, and discharge from some form of institutionalized 
residence setting); Homelessness Response: The Roots of the Crisis, CITY OF SEATTLE 
(last visited Aug, 7, 2019), www.seattle.gov/homelessness/the-roots-of-the-crisis 
(specifying, inter alia, health issues, unemployment, domestic violence, mental 
illness, addiction, poverty, lack of affordable housing, and racial inequities). For a 
demographic breakdown of homelessness, see The 2017 Annual Homeless 
Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.  
(December 2017), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2017-AHAR-
Part-1.pdf, at 8–9. 
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focus is instead on governmental and legal causal contributions 
to the phenomena of homelessness and resulting crimes. 
Ironically, government policy can increase homelessness and 
homelessness-related crime not only unintentionally, or 
indifferently, but precisely in attempting to address problems of 
homelessness.  The fancy term for this unfortunate causal 
phenomenon would be “iatrogenic etiology.”107  This term 
generally refers to causing some undesirable phenomenon, which 
is not a goal of the affected person, in attempting to treat some 
other related or unrelated malady.  While iatrogenic causation is 
most commonly discussed in medical contexts,108 the basic idea 
has been extended broadly109 to non-medical contexts.110  
Policy-based iatrogenic causation can overlap with the broader 
 
107 With ‘etiology’ referring, for our purposes, to the causation of a condition.  
See the discussion in Iatrogenesis, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iatrogenesis. 
108 See, e.g., N.R. Krishnan & A.S. Kasthuri, Iatrogenic Disorders, 61 MED. J. 
ARMED FORCES INDIA 2, 2 (2005) (“Iatrogenic disease is the result of diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures undertaken on a patient.”); Trisha Torrey, Iatrogenic  
Events During Medical Treatments, VERYWELL HEALTH (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.verywellhealth.com/what-is-iatrogenic-2615180. One might think of 
transmitting an infection to a hospital patient by means of an unsanitary item of 
medical equipment used in his or her treatment. 
109 For a broadening of the scope of discussion, though still with medical 
reference, see Iatrogenesis, ENCYCLOPEDIA (last visited Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-
press-releases/iatrogenesis (discussing the relatively narrow scope of clinical 
iatrogenesis, as well as the progressively broader concepts of “social iatrogenesis” 
and “cultural iatrogenesis”). 
110 See the especially interesting discussion by John Horgan, The Curse of 
Iatrogenesis: When “Cures” Make Us Sicker, SCI. AM. (July 18, 2011), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/the-curse-of-iatrogenesis-when-
cures-make-us-sicker/, referring in particular to the injuries caused, rather than 
avoided or minimized, by the use of hard plastic football helmets. 
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phenomenon of perverse unintended consequences111 of 
government policies.112 
Perhaps the most popular example of a housing policy with 
unintended, if not also unforeseen, unattractive consequences for 
homelessness is that of legal controls on rental prices of moderate 
to lower income residential apartment units.113  While typical 
rent control regulations may be intended to help renters in 
general, the main positive effects actually may be concentrated 
on those lucky enough to be the currently existing tenants,114 and 
 
111 For classic discussions, see Frederic Bastiat, That Which is Seen, and That 
Which is Not Seen, BASTIAT (originally published July 1850), http://bastiat.org/ 
en/twisatwins.html; Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive 
Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 894 (1936). For a brief recent overview, see Rob 
Norton, Unintended Consequences, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (last visited Aug. 7, 
2019), www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html. For a number of 
possible contemporary instances, see Mark J. Perry, Ten Examples of the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, AEI: CARPE DIEM (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.aei.org/ 
publication/ten-examples-of-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/. For a contribution 
directly addressing housing policy, prices, and homelessness, see Adam B. Summers, 
Rent Control, Prop. 10, and the Law of Unintended Consequences, INDEP. INST. (Oct. 
29, 2018), www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=10582. 
112 A policy may not be strictly intended to increase homelessness, where the 
increased homelessness is nevertheless clearly foreseen, and perhaps regretted, by 
some proponents of the policy in question. A policy might have consequences that 
strongly appeal to its proponents, such as to outweigh, in their minds, predictable 
indirect or long-term effects on the homeless population. Consider the policies 
addressed infra notes 113–159 and accompanying text. 
113 For discussion, see HENRY HAZLITT, ECON. IN ONE LESSON ch. 18 (1988), 
available at http://steshaw.org/economics-in-one-lesson/chap18p1.html; Walter 
Block, Rent Control, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (last visited Aug. 7, 2019), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html; Rebecca Diamond, What Does 
Economic Evidence Tell Us About the Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS (Oct.  
18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economic-evidence-tell-us-
about-the-effects-of-rent-control/; Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control 
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence From San Francisco, 
CATO INST. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-
economic-policy/effects-rent-control-expansion-tenants-landlords; Mark J. Perry, Due 
to Rent Control, S.F. Has 31,000 Vacant Housing Units As Frustrated Landlords 
Give Up, CARPE DIEM (May 7, 2011), http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/05/because-of-
rent-control-sf-has-31000.html. Some of the basic economic effects of such rent 
control programs were recently discussed in the context of the campaigns for and 
against California’s statewide ballot Proposition 10. See Summers, supra note 111; 
Melody Gutierrez, Prop. 10: California Rent Control Expansion Defeated,  
S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Prop-10-
California-rent-control-expansion-13369284.php?psid=cqPwe; see also Christian 
Britschgi, Oregon Likely to Become the First in the Nation to Adopt Statewide Rent 
Control, REASON (Jan. 18, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/01/18/oregon-likely-to-
become-the-first-in-the. 
114 See Diamond, supra note 113, at 1. 
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even then only in the short run.115  Thus it has been argued that 
“[w]hile rent control appears to help current tenants in the  
short run, in the long run it decreases affordability, fuels 
gentrification, and creates negative spillovers on the surrounding 
neighborhood.”116 
Once we see rent control in a dynamic, rather than a merely 
static or fixed, context, we can see how persons might rationally 
respond to the incentives established by typical rent control 
regimes.  Landlords might commonly disinvest over time in rent 
controlled properties, in favor of other sorts of real property not 
subject to price control.117  Landlords may recognize little 
incentive to invest in moderate income apartment unit repairs, 
maintenance, and the general livability of rent controlled housing 
units.118  And certainly, landlords may have little incentive to 
build new, additional moderate or low-cost housing if it will, or 
even later may, be subject to below-market rent controls.119 
Interestingly, though, it is difficult to empirically prove any 
clear and direct relationship120 between typical rent control 
regimes and the severity of the local homelessness problem.121  Of 
course, rigorous and decisive demonstrations in the social 
sciences tend in general to be difficult to arrive at.122  Other 
factors may obscure or confound any relationship between 
residential rent control and homelessness.123  Still, the absence of 
a clear correlation in this respect may surprise those who think  
 
 
115 See id. 
116 Id. 
117 See Diamond et al., supra note 113. 
118 See HAZLITT, supra note 113. There may thus be, over time, “no 
incentive . . . to keep existing low-income housing in good repair.” Id. The effects of 
chronic housing disrepair on homelessness, as incentivized by the rent control 
regulations at issue in a given case, would accrue only over time. 
119 See id. 
120 Note the inherent complications addressed in Manzi, supra note 105. 
121 See Lisa Sturtevant, The Impacts of Rent Control: A Research Review and 
Synthesis, NMHC RES. FOUND. (May 2018), https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/ 
knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf 18 (“There is no 
consistent relationship observed between rent control and the prevalence of 
homelessness.”); see also Dirk W. Early & Edgar O. Olsen, Rent Control and 
Homelessness, 28 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 797 (1998) (“We cannot reject the 
hypothesis that rent control has no net effect on homelessness.”); Paul W. Grimes & 
George A. Chressanthis, Assessing the Effect of Rent Control on Homelessness, 41 J. 
URB. ECON. 23 (1997) (“[R]ent control is a positive, although relatively small, 
determinant of a city’s shelter and street populations.”). 
122 See Manzi, supra note 105. 
123 See id. 
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of, say, San Francisco and Los Angeles for their residential rent 
control programs as well as for the scope of their homelessness 
problems.124 
On the other hand, we know that rent control may well 
create a class of “winners,” at least in the short run, in the form 
of existing tenants who cannot now be subjected to substantial 
rate increases.125  Some of those protected tenants might 
otherwise have become homeless.  Their housing units may have 
deteriorated in quality over time,126 but still remained habitable.  
This group of otherwise homeless tenants may at least partially 
offset the persons more adversely affected, over the long term, by 
typical rent control regimes. 
Two other considerations may help to account for the lack of 
a clear and strong relationship between rent control policies and 
homelessness.  First is a recognition that government policies 
affecting homelessness rates create incentives to which all 
parties may strategically respond over time.  Persons who are or 
may become homeless can often respond to changes in incentives, 
costs, and available alternatives.127  Any adverse effects of rent 
control on homelessness rates will thus be mitigated, if not 
entirely negated, by any number of adaptive responses.  These 
adaptive responses could include moving into otherwise 
unattractive family living arrangements, or leaving the 
geographical jurisdiction entirely.128  Both of these responses may 
reduce local homelessness rates. 
Second, it would hardly be surprising if a rent controlling 
jurisdiction also adopted other regulations having the 
counteracting effect of reducing homelessness rates below where 
they would otherwise be.129  And there is certainly no 
requirement that the relevant government recognize that the 
offsetting program was made more necessary because of that 
government’s own rent control program.  The response to any 
adverse effect of any governmental regulation, after all, may be  
 
 
124 Consider the predominance of rent controlled cities in the discussion at supra 
notes 113 and 159 and accompanying text. 
125 For discussion, see the authorities cited supra note 113. 
126 See authorities cited supra note 113. 
127 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 51 (1970). 
128 Leaving the rent controlling jurisdiction may require moving only a minimal 
distance geographically. 
129 Among the latter responses will be homeless persons who move to a 
jurisdiction without rent control, but who remain homeless. 
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the adoption of a separate, compensatory regulation, or any 
number thereof.130  The offsetting regulation may or may not be 
specifically targeted toward reducing local homelessness rates.131 
More broadly, though, homelessness rates are affected, often 
adversely, by a number of official government policies ranging far 
beyond direct residential rent control.  Some policies may be 
intended to reduce homelessness and have either positive or 
unexpectedly negative actual effects in that regard.132  Other 
policies adversely affect local homelessness rates, perhaps 
foreseeably so, but without the government’s explicitly seeking or 
desiring such effects.133 
Construction, land use, growth and developmental, zoning, 
public health, and housing regulations in general may have 
adverse effects on the availability of low cost housing that might 
reduce local homelessness rates.134  In large measure, opposition 
to the most affordable housing policy options reflects ordinary 
democratic processes, administrative agency processes, and 
judicial trials and appeals, all as reflected in governmental 
policies reducing the otherwise available supply of the least 
expensive housing units.135  Governments thus again cause, and 
bear responsibility for, homelessness and its incidence. 
 
 
130 See, e.g., Barak Orbach, What Is Government Failure?, 30 YALE J. REG. 
ONLINE 44 (2013), http://yalejreg.com/what-is-government-failure. 
131 See Sturtevant, supra note 121, at 18 (noting that rent control programs 
have broad direct effects far beyond homeless persons, whereas programs intended 
to reduce homelessness can be more narrowly targeted). 
132 See Alison McIntrye, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
(Spring 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect. 
133 As pervades the distinction between specifically intended or hoped for 
consequences and consequences that were merely foreseen or reasonably foreseeable, 
and in some sense even considered mildly regrettable. Id. 
134 See, e.g., Michael Hendrix, California Housing Revolution?, CITY J., (Feb. 21, 
2018), https://www.city-journal.org/html/california-housing-revolution-15731.html 
(“[T]he poor . . . are demanding shelter only to find its supply limited by stringent 
regulations.”); Aaron M. Renn, Heating Up a Housing Crisis, CITY J., (May 15, 2018), 
http://www.city-journal.org/html/heating-housing-crisis-15905.html (“Regulations 
that stifle building are a big part of the problem.”). 
135 For a very concise but broad ranging summary, see Matt Levin, 5 Reasons 
California’s Housing Costs Are So High, KQED, (May 4, 2018), http://www.kqed.org/ 
news/11666284/5-reasons-californias (citing, among other considerations, multiple 
layers of review for housing projects, not-in-my-backyard (“NIMBY”) based 
objections at a local city council level, local growth controls, and multi-year delays 
even for environmentally friendly projects resulting from required environmental 
impact assessments). 
2019] HOMELESSNESS, CRIMINALITY, AND POLICY 451 
In particular, local residents, homeowners, and landowners 
may have a substantial interest in preventing increased housing, 
and especially the lowest income-oriented housing, from reaching 
the market.  Local residents may have a compelling incentive to 
utilize, or exploit, multiple avenues in delaying or discouraging 
such construction.136  It is often assumed that a chronic scarcity 
of housing, particularly of housing accessible to low-level income 
persons, helps to maintain a major source of wealth for middle 
class residents in the form of the sustained or enhanced market 
value of their residences and neighborhoods.137 
In contrast, homeless persons within or outside the 
jurisdiction may typically be far less capable than other local 
residents of voting in accordance with their interests, of lobbying 
or donating to campaigns, and even of testifying in multiple 
forums.138  Low-income housing construction that might affect 
local homelessness rates can be opposed at the initial proposal 
and planning stages, and through administrative and judicial 
filings and appeals.139  By one estimate, in some jurisdictions 
there may be as many as twenty distinct official avenues for such 
opposition and delay.140  And the cost of pursuing an 
administrative or legal objection to a proposed project, and the 
costs to the potential developers, over a period of years,141 may be 
 
136 See, e.g., Kriston Capps, Blame Zoning, Not Tech, for San Francisco’s 
Housing Crisis, CITYLAB, (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/03/ 
are-wealthy-neighborhoods-to-blame-for-gentrification-of-poorer-ones/473349/ 
(“[R]esidents work tirelessly to prevent more housing from being built.”). 
137 See Paavo Monkkonen & Will Livesley-O’Neill, Overcoming Opposition to 
New Housing, UCLA LEWIS CTR. FOR REGIONAL POL’Y STUD., (2017), 
http://www.lewis.ucla.edu/opposition-to-new-housing; James Pethokoukis, California 
Has a Housing Crisis and Can’t Figure Out How to Solve It, RICOCHET, (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://ricochet.com/565600/california-has-a-housing-crisis (“ ‘[E]xisting 
homeowners do not want more affordable homes: they want the value of their asset 
to cost more, not less.’ ” quoting Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic 
Implications of Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. (2018)). 
138 See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of 
Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 5 (2018). 
139 See Monkkonen & Livesley-O’Neill, supra note 137; Adam Brinklow, San 
Francisco Delays Mission Housing Over Potentially Historic Laundromat, CURBED, 
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://sf.curbed.com/2018/2/14/17012606/laundromat. 
140 See Monkkonen, supra note 137. 
141 See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 138, at 7; see also Chang-Tai Hsieh & 
Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations Smother the U.S. Economy,  
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/housing-
regulations-us-economy.html (arguing that the administrative and judicial processes 
can operate so as to give any interested party what amounts to a protracted veto 
over any proposed housing project, regardless of the project’s potential effect on 
homelessness rates). 
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systematically lower than the costs of seeking to complete a 
project that may well not turn out to be profitable even if 
completed in a timely fashion.142  This again amounts to a set of 
government practices that are predictably skewed toward 
increasing homelessness. 
This is not to suggest that opponents of projects that might 
reduce homelessness rely on mere economic self-interest 
arguments when seeking to influence the political, 
administrative, legal, and judicial response to such projects.143  
Opposition can instead focus on concerns as to infrastructure, 
strain on utilities, traffic in general, environmental effects, 
historic cultural preservation, building safety,144 increased 
pedestrian crowding and congestion perhaps even along with 
anticipated increases in petty crimes,145 and even to the fair, free, 
relaxed use by all persons of public streets and other common 
spaces.146 
Whatever the appeal of any of these arguments and 
concerns, it is clear that rates of homelessness depend in 
meaningful part on the often predictably skewed processes and 
outcomes of official government law and policymaking.  The 
branch, level, and geographic scope of such governmental 
activities may vary from neighborhood planning boards all the 
way up to broadly applicable federal policies.147  Inescapably, 
though, government action, in all jurisdictions and at all levels, 
often causes homelessness, whether intentionally or not.  And 
with causally important government policymaking comes, 
 
142 See generally authorities cited supra notes 137–141. 
143 See, e.g., First Lutheran Church v. City of St. Paul, 2018 WL 3762560 at *2 
(D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2018); Ginia Bellaphante, Fighting Back Against the War on 
Homeless Shelters, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/ 
20/nyregion/fighting-back-against-the-war-on-homeless-shelters.html; Jeremy 
Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 371, 373 (2000). 
144 See Bellaphante, supra note 143. 
145 See First Lutheran Church, 2018 WL 3762560 at *2. 
146 Professor Waldron reports this argument in the context of homeless persons 
without meaningful shelter. See Waldron, supra note 143, at 373. Ironically, though, 
similar “livability” concerns could be raised with respect to any government policy 
that geographically concentrates previously homeless persons in any type of 
meaningful housing. 
147 Such governmental policies thus can involve any level of any government, 
from local planning commissions and zoning boards to federal housing subsidy policy 
choices. See, e.g., Vanessa Brown Calder, The Human Cost of Zoning Regulation, 
CATO INST., (Nov. 2, 2017), www.cato.org/blog/human-cost-zoning-regulation. 
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inescapably, government responsibility.148  This government 
causal responsibility encompasses what is referred to as the 
“iatrogenic etiology”149 of homelessness, through government 
action, or a set of government policies, at all levels. 
Governments also attempt, certainly, to compensate for their 
own homelessness-inducing policies with occasional efforts to 
mitigate the policies’ effects and to address non-governmental 
causes of homelessness.  Some of these attempts may be only 
partially effective, largely ineffective, or even counterproductive. 
In particular, governments have attempted to reduce 
homelessness, or the adverse effects thereof, by means such as 
providing housing subsidy vouchers,150 public housing and tax 
credits,151 specially targeted taxes,152 and by emphasizing the 
provision of housing itself prior to addressing related issues of 
health, disability, mental illness, or addiction.153  Recently, for 
example, the City of San Jose has experimented with paying 
twenty-five homeless persons $15 dollars per hour for four to five 
hours a day to pick up street litter.154  Technology-intensive 
 
148 For a general argument from sufficient state responsibility to the presence of 
sufficient state action for various purposes, see R. George Wright, State Action and 
State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 685 (1989). Herein, we make a loosely 
similar argument, while at the same time emphasizing that the state’s activities 
affecting homelessness clearly establish the state’s moral, and ultimately 
constitutional, responsibility to meaningfully address homelessness as a societal 
condition. 
149 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
150 See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Why Rent Control Is a Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/business/economy/rent-control-
explained.html. 
151 See id. 
152 See, e.g., San Francisco, California, Proposition C, Gross Receipts Tax for 
Homelessness Services, BALLOTPEDIA, (Nov. 2018), https://ballotpedia.org/San_ 
Francisco,_California,_Proposition_C,_Gross_Receipts_Tax_for_Homelessness_Servi
ces_(November_2018); Kate Conger, In Liberal San Francisco, Tech Leaders Brawl 
Over Tax Proposal to Aid Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/technology/san-francisco-taxes-homeless.html; 
Jonathan O’Connell & Gregory Scruggs, After Amazon Opposition, Seattle Passes 
Compromise Tax to Fund Homeless Services, WASH. POST (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/after-amazon-opposition-seattle-
passes-compromise-tax-to-fund-homeless-services/2018/05/14/2a7732a2-57b6-11e8-
8836-a4a123c359ab_story.html?utm_term=.413d48425111. 
153 See John M. Glionna, Utah Is Winning the War on Chronic Homelessness 
With ‘Housing First’ Program, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2015), www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-utah-housing-first-20150524-story.html. 
154 See Alix Martichoux, San Jose Will Pay Homeless People $15 an Hour to Pick 
Up Trash, S.F. GATE, (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/local/article/San-Jose-
trash-pick-up-litter-homeless-job-program-13336666.php. For a sense of possible 
unintended effects, see, for example, Shaila Dewan, Moral Hazard: A Tempest-
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approaches as well have been introduced, linking homeless 
persons with multiple social service agencies in real time.155  
Practical barriers to the use of shelter space have been identified, 
if not always remedied.156  These practical barriers include prior 
adverse experiences at a shelter, time limits on occupancy per 
day or on initial eligibility for residency itself, single gender 
limits, and required sobriety or participation in faith-oriented 
activities.157  Adjusting these policies at government-sponsored or 
subsidized shelters could mitigate some homelessness related 
problems, even while adding to shelter overcrowding in the short 
term.158 
In sum, government policy at all levels has been deeply 
involved in causally creating, mitigating, and exacerbating 
homelessness and its associated pathologies.  Commonly, though, 
official policy efforts to address homelessness are then limited in 
their effects, both favorable and adverse, by the operations of the 
democratic political process.159  Overall, the combination of 
governments’ causal contributions to the continuing problem of 
homelessness and the systematic inadequacies of governmental 
policy responses160 to homelessness justify significant attention to 
the idea of a federal constitutional right to housing.  A focus on 
 
Tossed Idea, N.Y. TIMES (February 25 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/ 
business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-self-reliance.html. 
155 See Aria Bendix, San Francisco’s Out-of-Control Homelessness Crisis  
Could Be Combated by a New Tracking Tool, BUS. INSIDER, (Sept. 4, 2018), 
www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-system-to-track-homeless-persons. 
156 See Unsheltered Homelessness: Trends, Causes, and Strategies to Address, 
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, (July 26, 2017), https://endhomelessness. 
org/resource/unsheltered-homelessness-trends-causes-strategies-address/. For a 
useful broader discussion, though locally focused, see Christopher F. Rufo, Seattle 
Under Siege, CITY J., (Autumn 2018), www.city-journal.org/seattle-homelessness. 
157 See Unsheltered Homelessness: Trends, Causes, and Strategies to Address, 
supra note 156. 
158 Presumably, making shelter life more viable, if not also more attractive, 
could result in overcrowding, or lack of space for some persons otherwise interested 
in shelter access. These outcomes could, in turn, lead to increased pressure for non-
shelter-based responses to low income housing concerns. 
159 See, e.g., Carol Galante & Carolina Reid, Expanding Housing Supply in 
California: A New Framework For State Land Use Regulation, TERNER CTR. FOR 
HOUSING INNOVATION (last visited Aug. 5, 2019), at 5, http://ternercenter.berkeley. 
edu/uploads/CCRE_Journal_-_Expanding_Housing_Supply_in_California_-_A_New_ 
Framework_for_State_Land_Use_Regulation.pdf (“[B]y the time these revisions 
pass, they often lack teeth or have so many restrictions that they apply only to a 
‘mythical’ project.”). More generally, consider the broad range of regulatory 
pathologies identified in PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN 
AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014). 
160 See supra Part I. 
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an enforceable federal constitutional right to housing, in any 
meaningful form, would, again, allow the courts, along with the 
rest of us, to bypass the unresolvable basic issues of 
homelessness offenses and criminal responsibility already 
examined above.161 
CONCLUSION: BYPASSING THE UNRESOLVABLE PROBLEMS OF 
HOMELESSNESS-RELATED CRIMINALIZATION AND THE 
INADEQUACY OF POLITICS AS USUAL ON THE WAY TO A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING 
Any complete argument for a federal constitutional right to 
some form of housing must first appeal to basic values, basic 
interests, basic human capacities, and basic needs,162 however 
unaccommodating American constitutional law has historically 
been in this regard.163  There seems to be no reason why 
arguments grounded in part on some combination of important 
values, interests, and needs cannot ultimately be successful. 
Of course, arguing for a constitutional right to some minimal 
housing only at this most fundamental level can be a bit tricky.  
It is, for example, tempting to think of some sort of housing right 
as a matter of basic values such as genuine freedom,164 material 
equality,165 or basic human flourishing.166  But many homeless 
 
161 See supra Part I. 
162 For a useful and concise summary of the international human rights law 
bearing upon housing, see The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev. 1, 
OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RTS., at 10–15, https://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf. See also Maria Foscarinas, et 
al., The Human Right to Housing: Making the Case in U.S. Advocacy, 38 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 98–100 (2004); Katy Wells, The Right to Housing, 67(2) 
POL. STUD. ASS’N 406, 409–10 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/ 
0032321718769009; Christopher Essert, Property and Homelessness, 44 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 266, 275 (2016). 
163 See Lindsey v. Normet, 406 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying 
the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245, 248 (2015). For a broader 
consideration, see R. George Wright, Homelessness and the Missing Constitutional 
Dimension of Fraternity, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 427, 437–38 (2008). 
164 See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 295, 295–96 (1991). 
165 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican 
Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37, 40, 43 (1990) 
(relying less on equality of distribution than on some less demanding standard of 
baseline minimalism or sufficientariansim); see also generally HARRY FRANKFURT, 
ON INEQUALITY (2015); GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS (2014). 
166 For broad background, see Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and 
Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 1–3 (2013), 
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persons most want not a classic free and open choice between 
homelessness and nonhomelessness, but simply a viable home, 
whether freely chosen or not.167  Freedom in the sense of choice 
among viable options is really not crucial in this context.  As well, 
thinking of a constitutional right to some sort of housing instead 
in terms of equality is certainly useful.  But any such 
constitutional right would obviously be thought of in terms such 
as minimal adequacy, decency, or sufficiency of the housing, 
rather than in terms of the size or quality of any guaranteed 
shelter being equal to that of some selected comparison group.168  
Adequacy, decency, and sufficiency do not imply substantive 
equality.  There would be an equal right to some sort of housing, 
but hardly a right that everyone’s housing be equal in quality to 
everyone else’s.  And while it is also certainly sensible to think of 
a constitutional right to housing in terms of human flourishing, 
important work would remain to be done in translating the 
general idea of human flourishing into a more determinate 
conception that would imply a federal constitutional right.169 
These complications, however, hardly undermine the 
possibility of a persuasive cumulative and converging multi-
element case, incorporating arguments at the most basic 
normative level, for a federal constitutional right to housing.  
Our focus herein has been on promoting the idea of a federal 
constitutional right to minimal housing by triangulation, through 
separate perspectives and motivations, exerting cumulating 
pressure from different directions.  Separate components of an 
argument for a constitutional right to housing are, on this 
approach, coordinated and brought to bear jointly. 
This Article highlights that criminalizing homelessness and 
homelessness-related statuses and conduct leads to unresolvable 
problems at the level of basic criminal theory.170  These 
 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/653/; GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY 
AND HUMAN FLOURISHING ch. 10 (2018). 
167 See Wright, supra note 163, at 454. But cf. Waldron, supra note 164, at 303 
(“The freedom that means most to a person who is cold and wet is the freedom that 
consists in staying under whatever shelter he has found.”). 
168 See sources cited supra note 165. 
169 The idea of human flourishing, as classically elaborated by Aristotle and in 
Professor Alexander’s general property theory, is more general than the concept of 
community and community responsibility developed by Alexander. See Alexander, 
Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, supra note 
166; see also Wright, supra note 163, at 438–39 (discussing the relevant application 
of the ideas of community, fraternity, and solidarity). 
170 See supra Part I. 
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unresolvable problems are of varying degrees of breadth and 
context-specificity,171 and these problems are plainly sufficiently 
important to impeach the logic and fairness of typical 
criminalization of homelessness.  A constitutional right to some 
sort of housing effectively bypasses these evidently unsolvable 
problems of personal criminal responsibility. 
This Article then focused on the role of governments, at all 
levels, in causally contributing to homelessness in general 
through various consciously chosen government policies.172  For 
the sake of simplicity, this Article focused on government policies 
as among the important causes of homelessness in general, as 
opposed to focusing on particular categories of homelessness.  
But it should be clear that consciously adopted government 
policies have affected, positively and negatively, the incidence of 
homelessness among, say, deinstitutionalized but seriously 
mentally ill persons,173 traumatized or otherwise vulnerable  
discharged military veterans,174 and newly released ex-offenders 
who are ill-prepared for transitioning to self-sufficient life in the 
community.175 
Thus, whatever the level of government, and however we 
think of the problem of homelessness, it is clear that consciously 
adopted government policies, of various sorts, have substantially 
 
171 Some problems of voluntariness, freedom, and responsibility are thus specific 
to homelessness, while others are of much broader scope and applicability. 
172 See supra Part I. 
173 See, e.g., H.R. Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill,  
35 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 899, 899 (1984), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pubmed/6479924; Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental 
Illness: Causes and Consequences, 15 AM. MED. ASSOC. J. ETHICS 886, 886  
(October 2013), https://ournalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/deinstitutionalization-
people-mental-illness. 
174 For background, see generally Veteran Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO 
END HOMELESSNESS (Apr. 22, 2015), https://endhomelessness.org/resource/veteran-
homelessness/; Background & Statistics, NAT’L COALITION FOR HOMELESS 
VETERANS (last visited Aug. 7, 2019), http://nchv.org/index.php/news/media/ 
background_and_statistics/. Specific categories of homelessness may co-present, and 
interact, in the cases of individual homeless persons. For context, see § 5 of The 2017 
Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB.  
DEV. (Dec. 2017), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2017-AHAR-
Part-2.pdf. 
175 For relevant data, see Claire W. Herbert et al., Homelessness and Housing 
Insecurity Among Former Prisoners, 1 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 44 (2016), 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4762459; Mindy Mitchell, Homelessness and 
Incarceration Are Intimately Linked, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS  
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-incarceration-intimately-
linked-new-federal-funding-available-reduce-harm/ (“Almost 50,000 people a year 
enter homeless shelters immediately after exiting incarceration.”). 
458 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:427   
contributed, directly or indirectly, to homelessness of all sorts.176  
These crucial government-policy contributions to the underlying 
pathologies exert a further intellectual and moral pressure on 
government to rectify the lamentable phenomena of 
homelessness to which it has substantially contributed.  
Governments in general are thus clearly implicated, causally and 
morally, in what is normally recognized as among the most 
serious and fundamental sorts of deprivations. 
At this point, it is no longer plausible or morally satisfactory 
for governments to adopt only modest programs, or merely to 
spend incrementally more, on homelessness-related programs.  
Typical programs, at whatever level of government, have plainly 
had only modest positive effects, and often amount merely to 
attempts to counteract with one set of policies the homelessness 
often predictably generated by other sets of government 
policies.177 
Consider, by way of analogy, how one would respond to a 
government that recognized a constitutional right to legal 
counsel in criminal cases,178 but that was content with only 
partial compliance with that constitutional right, with the level 
of actual compliance varying more or less randomly, and with the 
government taking credit for years of slightly greater compliance, 
and promising to try to do better after the years of slightly lower 
compliance.  Or consider, also outside the homelessness context, 
the federal constitutional right to not be subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment.179  What would the proper public response 
be to a government that in fact tended to causally contribute to  
 
 
 
176 See generally supra Part II. 
177 Consider, for example, local homeless service programs that only partially 
offset the homelessness causing effects of a range of other governmental polices. In 
general, modest increases in funding, against a continuing background of 
government policy causal contributions to homelessness, is unlikely to be effective. 
See David S. Lucas, The Impact of Federal Homelessness Funding on Homelessness, 
84 S. ECON. J. 548, 548–49 (2017). 
178 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). This constitutional 
right to counsel as explicitly wealth redistributive and publicly costly, would also 
count as a “positive” constitutional right. But see Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable 
Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (1992) 
(foregrounding negative constitutional rights). 
179 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) 
(discussing the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society”). 
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inhumane prison conditions, but that was content with both 
modest reform efforts, and correspondingly limited success, in 
reducing the number of such constitutional violations? 
Importantly, a federal constitutional right to minimal 
housing need not involve any level of government as a typical 
provider of housing as a matter of first resort.180  The crucial first 
step would instead involve imposing a heavier burden of 
constitutional justification on all government policies, at 
whatever level, that have the effect, separately or jointly, of 
significantly contributing over time to homelessness.181  And we 
should not expect a constitutional right to housing to be, in its 
contours, any more textually precise than, say, the scope in 
actual practice of the Commerce Clause.182  The scope of any right 
to housing should, however, reflect substantive interests, 
including the need to maintain reasonable incentives for socially 
productive behavior.183 
Finally, the logic of a distinctly federal-level constitutional 
right to housing is in part a matter of recognizing that the basic 
indignities of homelessness, and the basic moral and 
constitutional values at stake,184 do not substantially vary in 
their nature across state lines.185  As well, the federal 
government controls far greater resources than do individual 
states in meaningfully addressing homelessness and has 
important advantages of scale in affirmatively responding to 
homelessness.  And while local knowledge will certainly be 
 
180 For a discussion of implementation issues, see, for example, Shelby D. Green, 
Imagining a Right to Housing: Lying in the Interstices, 19 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & 
Pol’y 392, 442 (2012) (discussing, among other considerations, imposing a heavier 
burden of legal justification on all policy measures that operate, even inadvertently, 
to exacerbate homelessness). 
181 See id. As with any other constitutional right, whether negative or positive, 
issues of eligibility and of line drawing would of course require determination and 
revision. See id. 
182 See id.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) 
(“[W]e must never forget that it is a [broadly phrased] constitution we are 
expounding.”) (emphasis in the original). Historically, the Court seemed concerned 
about problems of line drawing in Lindsey v. Normet, 406 U.S. 56 (1972). Line 
drawing problems are probably more severe, however, in equal protection, 
substantive due process, free speech, and religion cases. 
183 See Ellickson, supra note 178, at 17. Professor Ellickson appears to focus on a 
constitutional right to housing only in conjunction with a number of other costly 
positive constitutional rights. See id. 
184 See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text. 
185 The constitutionally appropriate responses to homelessness may well, 
however, reflect local living cost differences, once the legal and politically imposed 
causes of homelessness have been negated or removed. 
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valuable in responding in qualitatively different ways to 
homelessness,186 federal authority would likely be necessary to 
overcome any local inclination to shift problems of homelessness 
onto neighboring jurisdictions, rather than to more meaningfully 
address the pathologies of homelessness.187  These considerations, 
taken collectively, thus triangulate upon a federal constitutional 
right to housing, and tend jointly to apply more rational and 
moral pressure, from various directions, toward the recognition 
of such a right. 
 
 
186 Investigation of the impact on homelessness of various local policies should 
presumably begin at the local level. As well, the motivating sentiments of 
community, solidarity, and fraternity in particular may, in many cases, be stronger 
at local levels. For background, see Wright, supra note 163. 
187 For a sense of the common local impulse to strategically, if also selfishly, 
“free ride” on the presumed efforts of other, perhaps similarly motivated, 
neighboring jurisdictions, see Wright, supra note 163, at 468–70. 
